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NOTES
California Expansion of First Amendment
Does Not Infringe on Federally Protected
Rights
In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins," the United States Supreme
Court held that the California Constitution, which protects speech and
petitioning in private shopping centers, does not violate the shopping
center owner's rights under the federal constitution. The shopping center
owner argued unsuccessfully that the state constitution violated federally
protected property rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments and
free speech rights under the first and fourteenth amendments.
A group of high school students filed this suit in California Superior
Court seeking to enjoin PruneYard Shopping Center from denying them
access for the purpose of distributing pamphlets and circulating petitions.' The students had been asked by a security guard to leave the
shopping center because their activity violated shopping center regulations.8 There was no evidence that any PruneYard patrons objected to
the students' activity, which the record indicated was peaceful and orderly at all times.
The trial court held that neither the federal nor the California Constitution entitled the students to petition on the shopping center property.
The California Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court, but the California Supreme Court reversed the decision.' It concluded that the Califor1. 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980).
2. The pamphlets and petitions opposed a United Nations resolution against Zionism.
Id. at 2038.
3. The PruneYard Shopping Center regulations prohibit any visitor or tenant from engaging in any publicly expressive activity that is not directly related to the center's commercial purposes. However, the shopping center owner would not object to expressive activity
conducted on a public sidewalk adjacent to the shopping center. Id.
4. Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr.
854 (1979). For commentary on the state court decision, see Note, 10 GOLDEN GATE L. REv.
805 (1980); Note, 20 SANTA CLARA L. Rav. 245 (1980); and Note, 2 WHTTIER L. REv. 423
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nia Constitutionb "protects speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised,
in shopping centers even when the centers are privately owned." On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that neither federally recognized property rights nor first amendment rights are infringed
by state protected rights of expression and petition exercised on shopping
center property.7
In PruneYard, the Supreme Court sought to weigh competing interests:
the state created right of expression of the petitioners8 versus the property rights of the shopping center owner. On first impression, it would
seem obvious that property rights would almost always yield to the fundamental right of freedom of speech. Yet, surprisingly, before
PruneYard, property rights had weighed heavier in the balance.10 In a
series of four Supreme Court cases concerning a claimed first amendment
right on private property,1 a method of analysis evolved that focused on
the character of the private property on which outsiders claimed a right
of expression: public versus private. The theory is that private property
will be deemed to be public as a matter of constitutional law when the
property is the functional equivalent"' of public property. 3 This theory
was applied in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,1 4 when antiwar protesters, standing on shopping center property, sought to distribute handbill invitations

(1980).
5. Art. I, § 2 reads: "Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or
abridge liberty of speech or press." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
6. 23 Cal. 3d at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
7. 100 S. Ct. at 2044.
8. In this casenote, "petitioners" refers to the party who sought to solicit signatures and
otherwise engage in expressive activity on shopping center property. It does not refer to the
appellant, the shopping center owner.
9. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that speech rights enjoy a preferred position over property rights. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) and Food Employees
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
10. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
11. These can be termed the first amendment "public function" cases or, more loosely,
"the shopping center cases." "Public function" is a phrase coined in Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501 (1946). See also Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,
407 U.S. 551 (1972); and Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308 (1968).
12. See 326 U.S. at 507-08 and 391 U.S. at 318.
13. A finding of "publicness" under the functional equivalent doctrine means that private property will be treated as an appropriate first amendment forum: the property owner
stands in the shoes of the state and his actions are then considered state action. See 326
U.S. at 507-08. However, it is important to remember that the freedom to exercise first
amendment rights even on actual public property is not absolute. See, e.g. Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966) and Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965).
14. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
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to a meeting to protest the draft and the Vietnam war. The United States
Supreme Court held that a private shopping center is not the "functional
equivalent" of public property when adequate alternative forums are
available. 6
Lloyd differs from the instant case in that Lloyd rested on a claimed
federal constitutional right alone; there was no state constitutional provision creating expansive rights of expression on private property."' Thus,
application of Lloyd to the facts in PruneYard was determinative only
after the court answered the following question about the holding in
Lloyd: did Lloyd merely define the limits of the protection that the first
amendment extends to expressive activity on private property or did
Lloyd recognize a federal right of an owner to control private shopping
center property?1 7 As is often the case in judicial opinions, the brevity of
the two paragraph answer given by the Court in PruneYard belies the
complexity of this question. s Generally, states are free to grant constitutional rights broader than the federal constitution,1 but the federal
supremacy clause s0 prevents an expansive state created right from in15. There were adequate alternative forums available in PruneYard. The shopping
center was adjacent to a public sidewalk. 100 S. Ct. at 2038. But the California Supreme
Court had determined that adequate alternative forums were irrelevant under the California
Constitution. This interpretation of a state constitutional provision by a state supreme court
was binding on the United States Supreme Court as long as the state construction did not
offend the federal constitution. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976).
16. In this respect, PruneYard more closely parallels Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507
(1976). In Hudgens, members of a union seeking to engage in labor picketing on a privately
owned shopping center claimed a federal right under the first amendment. The Supreme
Court found that the first amendment did not protect the picketing, but it remanded the
case to the National Labor Relations Board for a ruling on whether the picketing might be
protected under the National Labor Relations Act. 424 U.S. at 523. Just as Lloyd offered no
guidance in Hudgens in determining whether a federal statute would protect picketing on
private property, it also did not instruct how to balance property rights against the state
constitutional provision in PruneYard.
Lloyd and Hudgens have been the subject of extensive commentary. On Lloyd, see generally Lewis, Free Speech and Property Rights Re-Equated: The Supreme Court Ascends
from Logan Valley, 24 LAB. L.J. 195 (1973); Comment, From Logan Valley to Hyde Park
and Back: Shopping Centers and Free Speech, 26 Sw. L.J. 569 (1972); and Note, 1973 WisCONSIN L. REv. 612. On Hudgens, see generally Henely, PropertyRights and First Amendment Rights: Balance and Conflict, 62 A.B.A.J. 77 (1976); Comment, Constitutional
Law-Freedom of Speech: Property Rights Triumphant in the Shopping Center, 28 FLA. L.
REv. 1032 (1976); and Note, 8 ST. MARY's L.J. 366 (1976).
17. This is the issue the California Supreme Court addressed. 592 P.2d at 343-46, 153
Cal. Rptr. at 856-59.
18. For an example of the confusion that Lloyd generated, see Tenrich Assocs. v. Heyda,
264 Or. 122, 504 P.2d 112 (1972), in which four judges of the Oregon Supreme Court each
offered a different interpretation of Lloyd.
19. See, e.g., Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
20. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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fringing on a federally protected right."' In PruneYard, the shopping
center owner argued that the court in Lloyd had implicitly recognized the
existence of federal constitutional property rights as superior to federal
rights of free speech in the shopping center setting. He maintained that it
would thus violate the supremacy clause to allow the California expanded
speech right to infringe on his federal property right as recognized in
Lloyd. In other words, the supremacy clause would dictate that the balance struck in Lloyd between speech and property rights compels a similar result in PruneYard because of the similarity of the facts: the shopping center owner's federal property right should be protected against
state infringement.
On a close reading of Lloyd, one could easily infer that shopping center
property rights are protected by the federal constitution.22 On the other
hand, one could as easily infer that Lloyd only defined the extent of first
amendment protection of speech.23 In PruneYard, the Court has now de-

21. Arguably, property rights are either state or federally created. See Justice Blackmun's one sentence concurrence in PruneYard:"Mr. Justice Blackmun joins the opinion of
the Court except that sentence thereof, at 2042, which reads 'Nor as a general proposition is
the United States, as opposed to the several states, possessed of residual authority that
enables it to define "property" in the first instance."' 100 S. Ct. at 2044. Compare Justice
Marshall's view in his concurrence: "I do not understand the Court to suggest that rights of
property are to be defined solely by state law ...
" Id. at 2047. The prevailing view is that
property rights are predominantly a province of the state: "The great body of law in this
country which controls acquisition, transmission, and transfer of property, and defines the
rights of its owners in relation to the state or private parties is found in the statutes and
decisions of the state." Oregon ex. rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand &.Gravel Co., 429
U.S. 363, 378 (1977), quoting Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 155 (1944). The
distinction is probably academic though. If property rights are federally created, the
supremacy clause would not prevent a state from infringing on that right through its police
power when the state regulation has a substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare. See generally Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
If a property right is state created and defined, the procedural due process protection of the
fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution would still prevent the arbitrary state
contraction of even a purely state defined right. See generally Martinez v. California, 100 S.
Ct. 553 (1980); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). In PruneYard, the State of California
appeared to have a sufficient interest under its police power in promoting expressive activity
in shopping centers. 100 S. Ct. at 2043 n.8.
22. For example, in the first paragraph, Justice Powell stated: "We granted certiorari to
consider petitioner's contention that the decision below violates rights of private property
protected by the fifth and fourteenth amendments." 407 U.S. at 552-53.
23. The first amendment, through the fourteenth, protects free speech against state action. Similarly, the fifth amendment, through the fourteenth, protects private property
against state action. Chicago, Burlington, & Quincey R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233, 23637 (1897). The federal constitution affords no protection to private property against private
action. As there was no right of expression claimed under a state constitution or statute in
Lloyd, it is difficult to find the requisite state action that invokes federal protection; therefore, Lloyd could not have recognized a federally protected property right in the absence of
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clared the latter interpretation correct: Lloyd rests squarely on the first
amendment alone. 4 Thus, deprived of Lloyd, the shopping center owner
had lost an essential brick in the foundation of his argument.
The Court next considered whether the right to exclude others under
the fifth amendment guarantee against the taking of property without
just compensation or the fourteenth amendment guarantee against the
deprivation of property without due process of law had been unconstitutionally infringed. On the taking issue the shopping center owner relied
on Kaiser Aetna v. United States.ss In Kaiser Aetna, the owners of a
private pond had developed it into an exclusive marina that was open
only to fee-paying members. When the owners had dredged a channel
connecting the pond to navigable water, the federal government claimed
the pond had become subject to federal navigational servitude which entitled the public to its free use. The Supreme Court held the government's
attempt to create a public right to the pond interfered to such an extent
with Kaiser Aetna's reasonable investment-backed expectations" that it
amounted to a taking."1
The Court in PruneYard distinguished Kaiser Aetna on the ground
that the shopping center owner had "failed to demonstrate that the 'right
to exclude others' is so essential to the use or economic value of [his]
property that the State-authorized limitation of it amounted to a 'taking'."2 As a result, the Court could find no unconstitutional infringement
a finding that the shopping center was the functional equivalent of a municipality. Also, see
Justice Marshall's concurrence in PruneYard in which he stated that utilization of a state
trespass law by a property owner to exclude others constitutes state action. 100 S. Ct. at
2045. However, this view is not generally accepted since it goes too far; any resort to state
law to prevent a trespass on even purely private property would then constitute state action. Cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
24. "Lloyd held that when a shopping center owner opens his private property to the
public for the purpose of shopping, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
does not thereby create individual rights in expression beyond those already existing under
applicable law." 100 S.Ct. at 2041.
25. 100 S. Ct. 383 (1979).
26. See Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), a taking case:
"The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of
course, relevant considerations." Id. at 124.
27. 100 S.Ct. at 397.
28. 100 S.Ct. at 2042. The distinction could be rationalized in this way: in Kaiser Aetna,
the admission fee itself economically exploited the right to exclude outsiders from the marina. There would be a direct relation between the denial of that right and the ensuing
economic harm, which probably would have been substantial. In the shopping center setting,
the shopping center does not economically exploit the right to exclude per se since the owner has extended an invitation to the public to freely enter his property. The shopping center
owner objects not to the mere physical invasion of the petitioners, but rather to the activity
in which they engage after entering his property. Any compensable harm would, therefore,
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of the shopping center owner's property rights under the fifth
amendment.
The Court summarily dismissed the shopping center owner's claim that
he had been denied property without due process of law." Justice Rehnquist cited Nebbia v.New York 0 as providing the appropriate test: "The
guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the
law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means
selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the objective sought

to be [obtained].

11
3

He concluded that the shopping center owner had

"failed to provide sufficient justification for concluding that this test is
not satisfied by the State's asserted interest in promoting more expansive
rights of free speech and petition than conferred by the Federal

Constitution. "32
Finally, the Court addressed the shopping center owner's claim that the
first amendment prevents him from being "forced. . .to use his property
as a forum for the speech of others. '3 3 On this issue, the majority relied
on Wooley v. Maynard," in which the Supreme Court held that the State
of New Hampshire could not compel its citizens to display the state
motto, "Live Free or Die," on automobile license plates. In PruneYard,
have to result from the state sanctioned activity of soliciting signatures and distributing
leaflets. Conceivably, the shopping center's security costs or maintenance costs might increase as a result of the petitioner's activities. Or it is possible some shoppers, incensed by
the views expressed by the petitioners, may leave the shopping center before making a
purchase. While such harm is speculative, even if demonstrated it would be far less substantial than that present in many cases in which taking claims have been rejected. See, e.g.,
United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958) and Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). It appears the general trend is that the right to exclude
outsiders from private property will be limited when necessary to meet emerging social
needs. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), in which the Supreme Court held that the public accommodations provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
did not deprive a motel owner of property under the fifth amendment.
29. 100 S. Ct. at 2042. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution prevents the arbitrary contraction of even a purely state-conferred right.
Id. at 2046. (Marshall, J., concurring).
30. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
31. 100 S. Ct. at 2042, quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. at 525. Although the Court
in Nebbia applied a rational relationship test, use of the word "substantial" could suggest
that a species of "strict scrutiny" analysis was applied. To be sure of the correct test, Justice
Marshall stated in PruneYard that there is a core of common law rights, including rights
against trespass, which the state cannot abolish "without a compelling showing of necessity.. " He concluded "that 'core' has not been approached in this case ....There is no
basis for strictly scrutinizing the intrusion authorized by the California Supreme Court."
100 S.Ct. at 2047. (Marshall, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 2042-43.
33. Id. at 2043.
34. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
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Justice Rehnquist was able to distinguish Wooley on two grounds. Unlike
Wooley, the state in PruneYard had not compelled the display of a specific message; thus there was no chance for "governmental discrimination
for or against a particular message." 8 ' Secondly, the shopping center is
not purely personal property, such as an automobile, since the public is
openly invited onto the property. He reasoned that, based on this open
invitation, it is not likely views of the petitioners will be identified with
views of the shopping center owner. He added that the shopping center
owner could disclaim any connection with the petitioners by simply posting signs to that effect.
But, as Justice Powell wrote," the freedom of dissociation cannot restore the right to remain silent,87 a right which the first amendment
would seem to entail." Justice Powell was able to concur in the result
because he found it unlikely that shopping center customers would
ascribe the views of the petitioners to the shopping center management in
this instance. He also emphasized that the shopping center owner had
failed to allege that he disagreed with the views of the petitioner. However, he was careful to point out that if a shopping center owner was to
disagree strongly with the views expressed on his property, a different
case would be presented: "The strong emotions evoked by speech in such
situations may virtually compel the proprietor to respond .... Thus, the
right to control one's own speech may be burdened impermissibly even
when listeners will not assume that the messages expressed on private
property are those of the owner.''
In the alternative, Justice Powell added that even if the speech rights
of the shopping center owner were unaffected, the freedom of association
protected by the first and fourteenth amendments may be unconstitutionally infringed by the state-compelled support of the expression of
views of a third party. In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,'0 the
Supreme Court held that nonunion public employees' dues. paid to a
union under an agency shop clause may not be used to fund political
causes which the nonmember opposes. In PruneYard, Justice Powell
analogized that "[t]o require a landowner to supply a forum for causes he
finds objectionable also might be an unacceptable 'compelled subsidiza35. 100 S. Ct. at 2044.
36. Justice Powell, with Justice White joining, concurred in part and in the judgment.
37. Id. at 2050. See also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. at 705, in which the majority
impliedly rejects Justices Rehnquist's and Blackmun's dissenting view that objections to the
state motto could be expressed by a display of a counter motto. Id. at 722.
38. "The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of 'individual freedom of mind.'" 430 U.S. at 714.
39. 100 S. Ct. at 2050.
40. 431 U.S. 209 (1977). Abood is the seminal case on the constitutional doctrine of
nonassociation. See Note, 14 WAKE FoRwST L. REV. 633 (1978).
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tion' in some circumstances."' 1 But, after raising this profound constitu-

tional question, Justice Powell was able to dismiss it on the ground that
the shopping center owner had not relied on Abood as supporting his
right to exclude speakers from his property. 42 Justice Powell concluded
that the instant case suggested substantial federal constitutional questions that were not raised by the facts presented. 3
Any future litigation in the shopping center context is likely to center
on those constitutional questions raised by PruneYard that were not necessary for the Court to answer in reaching a decision. The Supreme Court
has now made it clear that Lloyd did not recognize federal constitutionally protected property rights;44 therefore, in the face of a state constitutional provision expanding rights of expression, the first amendment will
probably become the center of focus as shopping center owners seek to
find a haven in the relatively undeveloped first amendment rights of
nonexpression and nonassociation. In PruneYard, the majority opinion is
too broad as it seems to sanction the expression of emotionally charged
views on shopping center property that may be bitterly opposed by the
shopping center owner. 45 On the other hand, Justice Powell's nonexpression analysis is to narrow as it suggests he would not allow the expression
of views on shopping center property when the owner would be emotionally compelled to respond (even if the views would not be associated with
the shopping center management). The problem with his reasoning is that
it seems just as likely the shopping center owner would feel as emotionally compelled to respond to objectionable views expressed on an adjacent
public street as well as on the shopping center property. It is unclear why
the latter would foster a cognizable first amendment claim while the former obviously would not.
The first amendment right of nonassociation, as alluded to by Justice
Powell,' 6 may ultimately prove decisive in future cases. The question unanswered, though, is what is the nature of the state compelled association
required to infringe unconstitutionally on first amendment rights. Under
Justice Powell's analysis, ideological association is not determinative since
it is unlikely shopping center patrons will attribute the views of petitioners to those of the shopping center owner. Similarly, physical association
is not determinative because the owner has extended an open invitation
to the public to invade his property. Under a close reading of Abood, it is
41. 100 S. Ct. at 2049 n.2.
42. The shopping center owner also failed to allege that he disagreed with the views
expressed by the petitioners. Id. at 2050 n.2, 2051.
43. Id. at 2051.
44. See 100 S. Ct. at 2041.
45. Id. at 2043-44.
46. Id. at 2049-50 n.2.
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arguable that the association required is found in the forced economic
subsidization of the objectionable views of another.
If the Abood test were applied to facts similar to PruneYard, the question becomes whether it will be enough that the shopping center owner
has been forced to provide a forum for the expression of views to which
he objects, or will the owner be required to show that he has suffered
economic detriment as a result? If the latter is required, the shopping
center owner may be faced with the seemingly insurmountable hurdle
faced by the owner in PruneYard: he simply could not show sufficient
7
economic harm resulting from the activities engaged in on his property.'
If economic detriment is indeed required under the Abood test, future
cases will have to determine the extent of the harm required to forge a
constitutional claim under the first amendment.
MARK EMANUEL

47.

Id. at 2042.

